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i Category 14b 
RESPONDENTS1 PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, respondents, by and through their counsel of record, 
respectfully file the following Petition for Rehearing and 
certify that the petition is presented in good faith and not for 
delay. 
FACTS 
1. On August 1, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals, without a 
hearing and in a memorandum decision, reversed the decision of 
the trial court and held that according to Johnson v. Rogers, 763 
P. 2d 771 (Utah 1988) a cause of action existed in Utah for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. A copy of the 
memorandum decision is appended hereto. 
2. The court/ however, failed to rule whether plaintiff had 
stated a cause of action under the zone-of-danger test adopted by 
Johnson v. Rogers. 
3. The parties, anticipating that the court would adopt 
either the impact rule, the zone-of-danger rule, or the 
foreseeability rule, presented arguments on each issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Standard for Rehearing 
Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals provides 
that a petition for rehearing should be granted if the court 
"overlooked or misapprehended" an issue. Defendants1 petition 
for rehearing should be granted in this case because the court 
failed to address the issue of whether plaintiff had stated a 
cause of action under the zone-of-danger rule. 
II. 
The court failed to address the issue of whether 
plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the zone-
of-danger rule. 
2 
When the briefs were filed in this case the Utah Supreme 
Court had not yet handed down its decision in Johnson v. Rogers, 
763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), a copy of which is appended hereto. 
Therefore, the issue before the Court of Appeals was twofold: 
(1) whether a cause of action existed in Utah for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress; and (2) if so, whether 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover if the court adopted the 
impact rule, the zone-of-danger rule, or the foreseeability rule. 
In Johnson v. Rogers the Utah Supreme Court held that a cause of 
action existed in Utah for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965), 
the zone-of-danger rule. Therefore, it is incumbent on this 
court to decide whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action 
under the zone-of-danger rule. The issue was thoroughly briefed 
by both parties. See appellant's brief at 13-16; respondents' 
brief at 13-16; reply brief at 3, 11-12. 
Plaintiff argues that he has stated a cause of action under 
the zone-of-danger rule because (1) he was in the same elevator, 
(2) as a ten-year-old boy he perceived himself to be in danger, 
and (3) had his friend's "experiment" been successful, he would 
have tried riding up the outside of the elevator too. As a 
matter of law, these facts fall far short of meeting the zone-of-
danger test. 
3 
Discussing the zone-of-danger test in Johnson v. Rogers, 
Justice Durham stated: "The zone-of-danger rule . . . is an 
obi ective standard and serves to identify in consistent fashion 
those who are eligible to recover." 763 P.2d at 780 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, whether plaintiff subjectively perceived 
himself to be in danger is irrelevant. 
The fact that plaintiff was in the same elevator begs the 
question. He was inside the elevator operating the control 
buttons, not riding up the outside of the elevator like his 
friend, and was never in any physical danger of being crushed by 
the elevator. Plaintiff would only be in the zone of danger if 
he were riding up the outside of the elevator. The Restatement 
defines zone of danger as being subjected to an "unreasonable 
risk of bodily harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313(2), a 
copy of which is appended hereto. Plaintiff was never subjected 
to a risk of bodily harm, not even when he was trapped inside the 
elevator. 
Plaintiff's argument that he was in the zone of danger 
because, had his friend's experiment been successful, he would 
have tried riding up the outside of the elevator too, is without 
merit. 
Although plaintiff may have experienced emotional distress, 
he was simply not in the zone of danger. When the Utah Supreme 
4 
Court adopted the zone-of-danger rule, Justice Zimmerman and the 
other concurring justices knew that they were adopting a 
conservative rule that was hard to justify on a purely 
theoretical basis, but they chose to adopt this rule until they 
had some experience with the new cause of action. Justice 
Zimmerman wrote: 
I recognize that some of the limitations inherent 
in the "zone of danger" rule of section 313 are hard to 
justify on a purely theoretical basis. Indeed, I have 
serious concerns about the theoretical rationality of 
any limits that can be imposed on liability for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Cf. 
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1286 
(Utah 1987) (declining to recognize a loss-of-
consortium cause of action, in part because of the 
difficulty of defining rational limiting principles). 
However, section 313!s limitations seem to strike a 
fair balance between the interests those injured have 
in recovering damages and the interests of the courts 
and the public in predictable rules. At some future 
date, we may determine that there is merit in some of 
the other approaches surveyed in Justice Durham's 
opinion. However, until we have had experience with 
the cause of action, I conclude that it is best to take 
the more conservative approach and adopt the 
Restatement rule as written. 
763 P.2d at 785. 
Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for negligent 




Defendants1 petition for rehearing should be granted. The 
court should rule whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action 
under the zone-of-da^g^r test. 
DATED this / Lf day of August, 1989. 
MORGAN Jfe HANSEN 
Hansen 




I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
fore^^^ng were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
)f August, 1989. 
goi  
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Jackson Howard, 
Fred D. Howard, 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
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of t* Court 
Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890288-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Garff, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of 
defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress• The trial court 
granted the motion to dismiss based on Reiser v. Lohner, 641 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), which states that in Utah a cause of 
action for emotional distress may not be based upon mere 
negligence. After the briefs were filed in this case, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress exists in Utah. Johnson v. 
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988). According to Johnson, the 
test for determining liability for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is set forth in section 313 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as explained in the 
comments accompanying that section. Id. (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). We, therefore, reverse the trial court's grant of 
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Cottonwood Hospital, the hospital which 
treated Lynn for his 1974 heart attack. 
The tests Lynn undertook as part of com-
pleting the application revealed that Lynn 
had a first degree AV block. 
Finally, if Lynn's statement to Rigby 
that he had a heart attack in 1974 is imput-
ed to Prudential, then it stands to reason 
that Prudential had actual knowledge of 
the very fact of which it now complains. 
After Lynn died, Prudential quickly discov-
ered his 1974 heart attack by following-up 
on leads gleaned from his application. 
Indeed, Prudential has conceded on previ-
ous occasions that it could not rescind a 
policy based upon misrepresentations in the 
application because it failed to procure 
medical information after possessing leads. 
For example, in Claim No. NOD085449, 
Prudential paid the claim despite a misrep-
resentation because of its admitted failure 
to procure available medical records: 
Underwriter's comment on reverse of 
Part I indicates that there was a basis 
for requesting an [attending physician's 
statement], but he opted not to. Thus 
we waived the APS and accepted the risk 
with our eyes open. 
Similarly, in Claim No. NOD082820, the 
insured failed to disclose an extensive his-
tory of heart disease but did disclose the 
name of two medical centers where he had 
been treated. Prudential paid the claim 
notwithstanding the misrepresentation: 
[B]ecause it was decided at issue to 
waive a Special Class 3 rating based on 
the insured's cardiac abnormalities you 
are recommending that we pay the claim. 
I agree. As I see it, there is no basis for 
a misrepresentation defense. At under-
writing time we were on notice Un-
derwriting . . . did not pursue obtaining 
his medical records. 
Whether the "cumulative effect" of the 
information Prudential possessed, particu-
larly in light of its above-discussed prac-
tice, was sufficient to put Prudential on 
notice to conduct further inquiry into 
Lynn's past medical conditions, which, if 
done reasonably, would have led it to dis-
cover the conditions and treatments on 
which it bases its rescission argument, po-
v. ROGERS Utah 7 7 1 
771 (Utah 1988) 
ses a genuine issue of material fact that 
cannot, in our view, be decided as a matter 
of law. See Trawick v. Manhattan Life 
Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th Cir.1971). 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate CJ., 
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein; 
BILLINGS, Court of Appeals Judge, 
sat. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
«> 
Ray C. JOHNSON and Frances C. 
Johnson, Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Donald ROGERS and Newspaper Agency 
Corporation, a Utah corporation^ De-
fendants, Appellees, and Cross-Appel-
lants. 
No. 20622. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 25, 1988. 
Parents sued employer and driver em-
ployee for wrongful death of their child, 
emotional distress to themselves, physical 
injury to father, and also sought punitive 
damages against both defendants. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Philip R. Fishier, granted defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment on claims for 
punitive damages, but denied defendants' 
motion on issue of damages for father's 
emotional distress, and cross appeals were 
taken. The Supreme Court, Durham and 
Zimmerman, JJ., held that: (1) punitive 
damages are recoverable in drunk driver 
cases where plaintiff shows that defendant 
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acted with actual malice or reckless dis-
regard of the rights of others and that his 
drunken driving contributed to the acci-
dent; (2) question of whether driver's be-
havior justified award of punitive damages 
was for jury; and (3) the "complicity rule" 
governed issue of vicarious punitive dam-
ages; and in a concurring opinion, Zimmer-
man, J., held that (4) it could not be deter-
mined from the record whether there was 
sufficient evidence to go to jury on ques-
tion of employer's vicarious liability for 
punitive damages; and (5) plaintiff seeking 
recovery for negligent infliction of emotion-
al distress was required to be in "zone of 
danger". 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred in part and 
filed opinion, jomed by Hall, C.J., Howe, 
Associate C.J., and Stewart, J. 
1. Damages <^ >91(1) 
Punitive damages are not prohibited 
where a tort-feasor has been convicted and 
sentenced for criminal violations stemming 
from his tortious conduct. 
2. Damages <3=>91(1) 
In order to recover punitive damages 
in a drunk-driving case, plaintiff must show 
that defendant acted with actual malice or 
reckless disregard of rights of others and 
that his drunken driving contributed to the 
accident. 
3. Judgment <s=>181(33) 
Question of whether drunk driver's de-
fendant's behavior was extreme, out-
rageous and shocking enough to warrant 
punitive damages, in action for wrongful 
death against drunken truck driver, was 
for jury, precluding summary judgment for 
driver. 
4. Master and Servant <s=»331 
Principal and Agent <^159(1) 
Punitive damages can properly be 
awarded against a principal because of an 
act by an agent if the principal authorized 
the doing and the manner of the act, or the 
agent was unfit and the principal was reck-
less in employing or retaining him, or the 
agent was employed in a managerial capac-
ity and was acting in the scope of employ-
ment, or the principal ratified or approved 
the act. 
Concurring Opinion 
5. Appeal and Error <3=1177(9) 
It could not be determined from the 
record whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to go to the jury on question of 
whether employer was reckless in employ-
ing or retaining drunk driver, as would 
allow for an award of punitive damages 
against employer; since trial court had op-
erated under the assumption that employer 
could not, under any circumstances, be held 
liable for punitive damages, it was appro-
priate to remand case to trial court to per-
mit parties to properly present the issue 
and trial court to determine whether evi-
dence was sufficient for jury. 
6. Damages <3=»49.10 
In order to recover for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, plaintiff must 
show that he was in the "zone of danger". 
Gordon L. Roberts and Julia C. Attwood, 
Salt Lake City, for Johnsons. 
Edward J. McDonough and Lowell V. 
Smith, Salt Lake City, for Newspaper 
Agency Corp. 
P. Keith Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Rog-
ers. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages 
for the wrongful death of their child, as 
well as for emotional distress to both plain-
tiffs and physical injury to plaintiff Ray 
Johnson. They also sought punitive dam-
ages against defendants. The punitive 
damages claim against defendant Newspa-
per Agency Corporation (NAC) was based 
on vicarious liability for Rogers' conduct as 
well as on NAC's own conduct. The trial 
court granted defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment as to the claims for puni-
tive damages, but denied defendants' mo-
tion on the issue of damages for Ray John-
son's emotional distress. Plaintiffs filed 
JOHNSON 
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this interlocutory appeal, and defendants 
cross-appealed. We affirm the trial court's 
ruling as to the damages for emotional 
distress, but reverse on the issues relating 
to punitive damages. 
On December 10, 1984, NAC moved for 
partial summary judgment on the issue of 
punitive damages. On March 22, 1985, 
NAC filed a motion seeking dismissal or 
partial summary judgment as to the claims 
for emotional distress. On March 25, 1985, 
the trial court issued its memorandum deci-
sion granting NAC's motion for summary 
judgment as to punitive damages, relying 
on this Court's decision in McFarland v. 
Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1984). Finding that there was no 
evidence of actual malice on the part of 
NAC, the court granted partial summary 
judgment against plaintiffs on their claims 
for punitive damages against NAC. The 
court also ruled that Utah does not recog-
nize vicarious liability for punitive dam-
ages. On the basis of that ruling, defend-
ant Rogers moved for partial summary 
judgment as to his liability for both puni-
tive damages and emotional distress. Al-
though granting partial summary judg-
ment with respect to Rogers' liability for 
punitive damages, the court denied summa-
ry judgment on the father's emotional dis-
tress claim, holding that a parent who is in 
the "zone of danger" may recover for the 
trauma associated with seeing a child in-
jured. The claim for emotional distress on 
the part of plaintiff Frances Johnson was 
denied, but that ruling is not appealed here. 
I. Facts 
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 16, 
1982, plaintiff Ray Johnson and his eight-
year-old son David were waiting for a 
"walk" signal before crossing a street in 
downtown Salt Lake City. A truck crossed 
the intersection and jumped the curb, kill-
ing David and injuring Ray. The truck 
was owned by NAC and operated by Don-
ald Rogers. It is admitted that Rogers 
was driving under the influence of alcohol 
and that he negligently caused the injuries. 
Rogers began working for NAC in May, 
1980. Rogers' license had previously been 
v. ROGERS Utah 773 
771 (Utah 1988) 
revoked in Oregon after a conviction for 
driving under the influence; NAC failed to 
discover this fact. Rogers and other NAC 
employees sometimes reported to work in-
toxicated. Although NAC had written 
rules forbidding driving while intoxicated, 
it apparently did not enforce these rules. 
Rogers had been a heavy drinker for ap-
proximately six months to a year prior to 
the accident. Depositions of NAC employ-
ees indicate that the use of alcohol and 
marijuana was widespread and that no ef-
fort was made to curtail such use. These 
depositions also indicate that NAC vehicles 
were sometimes returned with beer cans in 
them, and on one occasion, an NAC super-
visor who observed drivers smoking mari-
juana told the drivers to "do it on the 
road." Moreover, many deponents con-
tended that these abuses were widely 
known and that NAC management either 
knew of these practices or could easily 
have found out about them. 
II. Standard for the Imposition of Puni-
tive Damages 
The trial court held in this case that "evil-
intent," "actual malice," or "malice in fact" 
is required for the imposition of punitive 
damages. That holding misconstrues our 
case law; it was made in reliance on lan-
guage in McFarland v. Skaggs Compa-
nies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), iu 
which this Court, after extensive considera-
tion of specific policy concerns, established 
an "actual malice" standard for the imposi-
tion of punitive damages in false imprison-
ment cases. The opinion itself, as well as 
the law review article quoted extensively 
therein, focuses solely on the "ancient tort 
of false imprisonment [which creates] liabil-
ity for wrongfully restraining another's 
freedom of movement" and concludes that 
an actual malice standard is necessary to 
balance the competing interests in shoplift-
ing cases. 
The very real problem of shoplifting 
pits two important considerations against 
each other—the right of the merchant to 
protect his inventory and the right of the 
citizen to be free from unwarranted de-
tention and accusation 
774 Utah 763 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
[B]y sanctioning unrestricted punitive 
damages for a good faith mistake, the 
Terry [v. Z.C.M.L, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979) ] court tipped the balance too far in 
favor of the patron and against the mer-
chant [The actual malice rule] pro-
tects the interests of both merchant and 
patron without opening the door to un-
warranted punitive damage recoveries. 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 
678 P.2d at 304 (quoting Note, False Im-
prisonment—Punitive Damages May Be 
Awarded As A Matter of Law, 1980 Utah 
L.Rev. 694, 699-700 (1980)). 
McFarland departed from the Terry 
"malice in law" standard only for false 
imprisonment cases and only because of 
carefully detailed policy reasons related to 
that tort. Since McFarland, this Court has 
explicitly articulated a broader standard 
for the imposition of punitive damages in at 
least two cases: Atkin Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Telephone, 709 P.2d 330 
(Utah 1985) (intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations), and Syner-
getics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 
1106 (Utah 1985) (fraud, misrepresentation, 
and deceit). We stated: "Punitive dam-
ages, among other things, punish conduct 
which manifests a knowing or reckless* in-
difference toward, and disregard of, the 
rights of others." Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 
1112-13 (citations omitted). "Before puni-
tive damages may be awarded, the plaintiff 
must prove conduct that is willful and mali-
cious . . . or that manifests a knowing and 
reckless disregard toward the rights of oth-
ers." Atkin Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at 
337 (citations omitted). In both of those 
cases, we cited with approval identical or 
1. Fritz v. Salvo, 406 So.2d 884 (Ala.1981); Smith 
v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977) 
(citing Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 
(1929)); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 
S.W.2d 293 (1948); Taylor v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, 24 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 
157 CaLRptr. 693 (1979); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 
Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964); Walczak v. 
Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del.1971); Ingram v. Pettit, 
340 So.2d 922 (Fla.1976); Chitwood v. Stoner, 
60 Ga.App. 599, 4 S.E.2d 605 (Ga.Ct.App.1939); 
Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill.App.2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 
90 (Ill.App.Ct.1958); Nichols v. Hocke, 297 N.W. 
2d 205 (Iowa 1980) (citing Sebastian v. Wood, 
246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954)); Wigging-
tonsAdm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933 
similar language from cases decided prior 
to McFarland: Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983) 
(cited in Synergetics); Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); 
First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 
Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) (cited hi 
Synergetics and Atkin Wright & Miles); 
Terry v. Z.C.M.L, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) 
(cited in Atkin Wright & Miles). The cita-
tion of the Terry standard in Atkin Wright 
& Miles is significant because it conclusive-
ly demonstrates that McFarland overruled 
the use of the Terry standard only for 
false imprisonment cases, contrary to the 
argument made in this case by the defend-
ants. 
The standard for punitive damages in 
non-false imprisonment cases is thus clean 
they may be imposed for conduct that is 
willful and malicious or that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference and dis-
regard toward the rights of others. De-
fendants argue that mere driving under the 
influence of alcohol is insufficient to sup-
port a finding of knowing and reckless 
indifference and disregard for the rights 
and safety of others, and Rogers further 
argues that punitive damages are inappro-
priate here because he was convicted and 
sentenced for criminal violations stemming 
from the same acts. 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions which have considered the issue have 
ruled that punitive damages are available 
in drunk driving cases.1 
One who willfully consumes alcoholic 
beverages to the point of intoxication, 
(1920); Hawkinson v. Geyer, 352 N.W.2d 784 
(Minn.App.1984); Southland Broadcasting Co. v. 
Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So.2d 572 (1951); 
Smith v. Sayles, 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1982); Allers v. Willis, 197 Mont. 499, 643 P.2d 
592 (1982); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 
487 P.2d 167 (N.M.Ct.App.1971); Colligan v. 
Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y.Civ. 
Ct.1973); Huff v. Chrismon, 68 N.CApp. 525, 
315 S.E.2d 711 (N.C.Ct.App.), review denied, 311 
N.C. 756, 321 N.E.2d 134 (1984); Harrell v. 
Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973); Pratt v. 
Duck, 28 Tenn.App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945); 
Crider v. Appelt, 696 S.W.2d 55 (Tex.Ct.App. 
1985). 
JOHNSON 
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knowing that he thereafter must operate 
a motor vehicle, thereby combining 
sharply impaired physical and mental 
faculties with a vehicle capable of great 
force and speed, reasonably may be held 
to exhibit a conscious disregard for the 
safety of others. 
The allowance of punitive damages in 
such cases may well be appropriate be-
cause of another reason, namely to deter 
similar future conduct— [T]he appli-
cable principle was well expressed in a 
recent Oregon case 
[T]he fact of common knowledge that 
the drinking driver is the cause of so 
many of the more serious automobile 
accidents is strong evidence in itself to 
support the need for all possible means 
of deterring persons from driving auto-
mobiles after drinking, including expo-
sure to awards of punitive damages in 
the event of accidents. 
Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 24 Cal.3d 890, 897, 598 P.2d 854, 
857, 157 CaLRptr. 693, 697 (1979) (quoting 
Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 190, 508 P.2d 
211, 214-15 (1973)). 
[1] Assessing punitive damages in 
cases such as this is not inappropriate or 
inconsistent with the deterrence function, of 
damages. See Peterson v. Superior Court 
of Ventura County, 31 Cal.3d 147, 154-62, 
642 P.2d 1305, 1308-13, 181 CaLRptr. 784, 
787-92 (1982); Soria v. Sierra Pac. Air-
lines, 111 Idaho 594, 610, 726 P.2d 706, 722 
(1986); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 
100, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1954); Dorn v. 
Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, 239-40, 458 P.2d 
942, 944 (1969); Ellis, Fairness and Effi-
ciency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 
56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1 (1982); Schwartz, Deter-
rence and Punishment in the Common 
Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 
56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 133 (1982). Given their de-
terrence value, punitive damages are not 
prohibited where a tort-feasor has been 
convicted and sentenced for criminal viola-
tions stemming from his tortious conduct 
In Huffv. Chrismon, 68 N.CApp. 525, 315 
S.E.2d 711, review denied, 311 N.C. 756, 
321 S.E.2d 134 (1984), the North Carolina 
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Court of Appeals stated that the assess-
ment of punitive damages in civil cases, 
separate from any criminal penalties im-
posed, was "consistent with the trend to 
maximize punishment and deterrence of im-
paired drivers " 68 N.CApp. at 532, 
315 S.E.2d at 715. On the specific question 
of deterrence, the Oregon Supreme Court 
went on to observe: 
It may be debatable whether either 
awards of punitive damages or the impo-
sition of criminal penalties will effective-
ly deter persons from driving after drink-
ing. However, in the absence of a show-
ing of substantial evidence to the con-
trary, we are not prepared to hold that 
law enforcement officials and courts, 
who have a heavy responsibility in this 
area, are wrong in their present apparent 
assumption that both criminal penalties 
and awards of punitive damages may 
have at least some deterrent effect in. 
dealing with this serious problem. We 
are also not aware of any good reasons 
why punitive damages should not have 
as much deterrent effect upon this type 
of wanton and reckless conduct as upon 
other types of conduct in which awards 
of punitive damages are traditionally ap-
proved by the courts. 
Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. at 190-91, 508 
P.2d at 215 (citations omitted; emphasis 
added). 
[2] In this state, the Utah Court of Ap-
peals has held that punitive damages are 
available in drunk driving cases. In Bis-
well v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah CtApp. 
1987), the court determined that punitive 
damages may be awarded upon proof of 
either actual or legal malice and that the 
imposition of punitive damages against 
drunk drivers is consistent with Utah's 
public policy. Id. at 84. The court held 
that in order to recover, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant acted with actual 
malice or a reckless disregard of the rights 
of others and that his drunken driving con-
tributed to the accident. Id. 
We agree with the majority of other jur-
isdictions and with the Utah Court of Ap-
peals. We see no reason to exclude drunk 
driving from the categories of outrageous 
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conduct, either willful or knowingly reck-
less, which are eligible for the imposition of 
punitive damages. We emphasize that this 
is not a "per se" rule: the mere allegation 
or fact of having caused an accident or 
injury after drinking and driving will not 
support an award of punitive damages. 
The standard is fact-specific and requires 
proof of conduct which is knowingly reck-
less and exhibits a high degree of dis-
regard for the safety of others. To that 
extent, defendants are correct when they 
argue that mere allegations of driving af-
ter drinking could not support a punitive 
damages award. 
[3] In this case, however, we have alle-
gations, evidence, and admissions of far 
more outrageous behavior. Rogers was 
employed as a truck driver. During the 
period of time immediately before report-
ing to work on the evening of the accident, 
he had consumed approximately seven 
mixed drinks containing vodka and had 
"chug-a-lugged" a 27-ounce drink contain-
ing two mini-bottles of tequila. His blood 
alcohol content after the accident was .18 
percent. He admitted that he had been a 
"heavy" or "problem" drinker for six 
months to a year prior to the accident and 
that he had been convicted of driving under 
the influence in Oregon. At 10:00 p.m., 
Rogers drove his truck across an intersec-
tion in downtown Salt Lake City, up over 
the curb and onto the sidewalk, hitting and 
throwing several concrete pillars and the 
eight-year-old victim who had been stand-
ing on the corner. 
The foregoing facts, if proved to a jury, 
would certainly be sufficient to support a 
finding of knowing and reckless disregard 
for the safety of others. Defendants sug-
gest that because Rogers was probably too 
drunk to know or control what he was 
doing, he cannot be found to have been 
"knowingly" reckless. It would be perfect-
ly permissible for a jury, however, to find 
that the element of deliberation and knowl-
edge in his behavior comes from his con-
2. Plaisance v. Yelder, 408 So.2d 136 (Ala.Civ. 
App.1981); Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 
132 Ariz. 498, 647 P.2d 629 (1982); Rickman v. 
Safeway Stores, 124 Mont. 451, 227 P.2d 607 
(1951); Kurrt v. Radencic, 193 Okl. 126, 141 P.2d 
sumption of large amounts of alcohol just 
before reporting to work and his decision 
to get into his truck and drive it on the 
public streets. It would be anomalous if a 
sober driver who drives a vehicle onto a 
sidewalk with people on it could be held 
liable for punitive damages (which would 
certainly be possible in the appropriate fac-
tual context), while one who has deliberate-
ly rendered himself incapable of driving 
safely and then drives could not. On the 
other hand, mere drinking and driving, ab-
sent evidence that the manner of doing so 
reflects conscious disregard for the safety 
of others, would not qualify for punitive 
damages. Cf Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 
905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960). As with puni-
tive damages in all personal injury cases, it 
is the extreme, outrageous, and shocking 
behavior that justifies their imposition in 
drunk driving cases. The behavior alleged 
in this case is sufficiently extreme, out-
rageous, and shocking to permit the issue 
to go to the jury. Therefore, we hold that 
the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the availability of punitive 
damages and reverse on that issue. 
III. Vicarious Liability of Employer for 
Punitive Damages 
The issue of when an employer can be 
held vicariously liable for punitive damages 
because of the acts of nonmanagerial em-
ployees is one of first impression in Utah. 
There are currently at least four ap-
proaches to such liability in other jurisdic-
tions. The first is a straight-forward vica-
rious liability rule that permits recovery 
against an employer whenever the employ-
er is liable for the same conduct in compen-
satory damages.2 
A second, more conservative approach 
has been adopted by a number of other 
jurisdictions. See J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, 
Punitive Damages Law and Practice, ch. 
24, at 4-5 (1987), and cases cited therein. 
This standard appears in the Restatement 
580 (1943); Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 
271 Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975); Delahanty v. 
First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 318 Pa.Super. 90, 
464 A.2d 1243 (1983). 
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(Second) of Torts § 909 and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency § 217C: 
Punitive damages can properly be award-
ed against a master or other principal 
because of an act by an agent if, but only 
if, 
(a) the principal or a managerial agent 
authorized the doing and the manner of 
the act, or 
(b) the agent was unfit and the princi-
pal or a managerial agent was reckless in 
employing or retaining him, or 
(c) the agent was employed in a mana-
gerial capacity and was acting in the 
scope of employment, or 
(d) the principal or a managerial agent 
of the principal ratified or approved the 
act. 
The third standard takes an intermediate 
approach between pure vicarious liability 
and the Restatement standard, which is not 
"true" vicarious liability because it is predi-
cated on acts of the principal. This stan-
dard has been adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Florida and the United States 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and is char-
acterized by the parties as a "some fault" 
rule: 
Before an employer may be held vicari-
ously liable for punitive damages under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
there must be some fault on his part. 
Although the misconduct of the employ-
ee, upon which the vicarious liability of 
the employer for punitive damages is 
based, must be willful and wanton, it is 
not necessary that the fault of the em-
ployer, independent of his employee's 
conduct, also be willful and wanton. It 
is sufficient that the plaintiff allege and 
prove some fault on the part of the em-
ployer which foreseeably contributed to 
the plaintiffs injury to make him vicari-
ously liable for punitive damages. 
Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 
393 So.2d 545, 549 (Fla.1981); see also Dor-
sey v. Honda Motor Co., 670 F.2d 21 (5th 
Cir.1982). 
Finally, there are four states which ap-
parently prohibit "vicarious" punitive dam-
ages altogether. See Briner v. Hyslop, 
v. ROGERS Utah 7 7 7 
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337 N.W.2d 858, 864-65 (Iowa 1983), and 
cases cited therein. 
The courts of other jurisdictions are 
nearly evenly divided over the proper basis 
for "vicarious" punitive damage liability. 
See J. Ghiardi & J. Kirchner, Punitive 
Damages Law and Practice, ch. 24, at 
36-39 (1987) (twenty-one states follow tra-
ditional respondeat superior rules, and 
nineteen follow the "complicity rule" em-
bodied in the Restatement). 
There are serious arguments in support 
of the position that "vicarious" punitive 
damages ought to be abandoned entirely as 
inefficient and unfair. One recent treat-
ment of the subject reached the following 
conclusion: 
In summary, vicarious punitive dam-
age liability cannot be justified as de-
served punishment. Indeed, it is usually 
conceded to be unfair. Deterrence alone 
is thus relied on to justify it. The fore-
going analysis indicates, however, that 
efficient levels of deterrence are unlikely 
to be promoted by vicarious punitive 
damage liability, even assuming that the 
criteria for assessing punitive damages 
can be made certain and predictable. 
When that assumption is dropped, it be-
comes apparent that the combination of 
vicarious liability with the prevailing un-
certain criteria for determining liability 
and magnitude serves to diminish rather 
than to increase aggregate welfare. 
Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law 
of Punitive Damages, 56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1, 71 
(1982). 
In an article in the same symposium, 
another scholar suggests that closer atten-
tion should be paid to the differential 
analysis required by punishment versus de-
terrence as goals and disagrees with Pro-
fessor Ellis on vicarious punitive damages; 
Consider now the problem of vicarious 
liability for punitive damages. As a gen* 
eral matter, our existing criminal law 
regards vicarious liability as an imper-
missible basis for punishment (except, 
perhaps, for a limited range of minor 
penalty regulatory offenses): one man 
cannot be judged morally guilty on ac-
count of another man's crime. By con-
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trast, our civil law of torts warmly em-
braces vicarious liability, apparently be-
cause the employer is in the best position 
to control the behavior of his own em-
ployees. If punishment is the chief pur-
pose of punitive damages, then the crimi-
nal law model should prevail and vica-
rious liability should be rejected. But if 
deterrence is the principle purpose, the 
tort law model seems controlling, and 
vicarious liability can be endorsed. 
Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in 
The Common Law of Punitive Damages: 
A Comment, 56 S.Cal.L.Rev. 133, 136 
(1982). 
[4] The defendants in this case have 
not, however, argued the legitimacy of vi-
carious punitive damages; they have ad-
dressed only the standard for imposition. 
We are therefore not inclined to address 
the fundamental question at this time, but 
we are sufficiently concerned about the 
rationale supporting the doctrine to opt for 
the more conservative standard articulated 
by the Restatement rule. The "complicity 
rule" (a term apparently coined by Morris, 
Punitive Damages in Personal Injury 
Cases, 21 Ohio StLJ. 216, 221 (1969)), Urn-
its vicarious punitive damages to those sit-
uations where wrongful acts were commit-
ted or specifically authorized by a manage-
rial agent or were committed by an unfit 
employee who was recklessly employed or 
retained. Since the rule requires some 
wrongful action on the part of the employ-
er, it addresses at least some of the punish-
ment and deterrence goals accepted thus 
far in the law of this state. 
The issue thus becomes whether there 
exist triable issues of fact regarding NAC's 
liability for punitive damages under the 
Restatement standard. In addition to the 
facts described earlier in this opinion, the 
following facts involving NAC were the 
subject of testimony or other evidence dur-
ing discovery: although NAC purportedly 
ran periodic driver's license checks on its 
drivers, it failed to learn of Rogers' previ-
ous conviction and also failed to learn that 
two other drivers drove on suspended li-
censes while in NAC employ; Rogers and 
other employees testified that he made no 
effort to hide his drinking habits and that 
they were apparent in the workplace; Rog-
ers frequently came to work intoxicated, 
openly consumed alcohol while he was at 
work, and periodically took alcohol with 
him in company vehicles when he made 
deliveries; alcohol and drug use were rela-
tively common during working hours and in 
company vehicles and that NAC supervi-
sors not only were aware of such use, but 
were also participants on occasion; alcohol 
and drug use at work was common, open, 
and the subject of regular "office gossip"; 
there was virtually no supervision of em-
ployees on the night shift, and no vehicle 
check-out system; and NAC policies 
against drug and alcohol use were not en-
forced. 
I note, of course, that many or all of the 
above facts may be disputed by NAC, but 
on a motion for summary judgment, we 
should determine whether the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law on a view of the proffered facts most 
favorable to the losing party. Based on 
the brief summary detailed above, I con-
clude that plaintiffs are entitled to a jury 
verdict on the question of whether NAC 
"authorized the doing and the manner of 
the act" of taking out company vehicles on 
company business while in a state of ex-
treme intoxication or whether "the agent 
was unfit and the principal or a managerial 
agent was reckless in employing or retain-
ing him." Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 909(a), (b) (1965). Therefore, I would 
reverse the summary judgment on the is-
sue of punitive damages against NAC and 
remand for trial. 
IV. Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress 
Also before us on appeal is the question 
of whether a cause of action for negligent-
ly inflicted emotional distress exists in 
Utah and, if so, under what circumstances 
it exists. Defendants rely on Reiser v. 
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), and 
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 
344 (1961). In Reiser, the Court rejected 
without analysis a claim for emotional dis-
tress to the parents of a child damaged by 
allegedly negligent medical treatment 
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The opinion says, "[I]t is well established in 
Utah that a cause of action for emotional 
distress may not be based upon mere negli-
gence." The two cases relied on for that 
principle are Samms v. Eccles and Jeppsen 
v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916). 
In Samms v. Eccles, addressing a claim 
for emotional distress resulting from ''inde-
cent proposals," the Court held: 
Our study of the authorities, and of the 
arguments advanced, convinces us that, 
conceding such a cause of action may not 
be based upon mere negligence, the best 
considered view recognizes an action for 
severe emotional distress, though not ac-
companied by bodily impact or physical 
injury, where the defendant intentionally 
engaged in some conduct toward the 
plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflict-
ing emotional distress, or, (b) where any 
reasonable person would have known 
that such would result; and that his ac-
tions are of such a nature as to be con-
sidered outrageous and intolerable in 
that they offend against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and mo-
rality. 
11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 346-47 
(citations omitted). 
Jeppsen v. Jensen, although containing 
some dicta suggesting that the Court ac-
cepted the then-prevailing majority view 
that no recovery could be had for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, does not so 
hold; the Court merely determined that a 
complaint alleging emotional distress as a 
result of "willful and wanton" acts stated a 
cause of action. 
While it is true, and that it is so is not 
remarkable, that there are some cases 
which seem to hold that in no case can a 
recovery be had where the injuries are 
caused alone from fright, yet it is also 
true that there are many cases which 
seem to hold that a recovery may be had 
for fright alone, although the acts com-
plained of constituted merely negligent 
acts. Such cases are, however, not nu-
merous, and the great weight of authori-
ty is reflected in [the cases to the con-
trary cited above]. 
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Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah at 543, 155 P. 
at 431. 
In view of the age of Samms v. Eccles 
(decided twenty-seven years ago) and 
Jeppsen v. Jensen (decided seventy-two 
years ago), a reexamination of their premis-
es is timely. This is particularly so in view 
of the extensive development of the law in 
this area in the intervening period and the 
abandonment by other jurisdictions of the 
precedents which were persuasive to this 
Court in its earlier opinions. Therefore, we 
depart from the approach taken in Reiser 
v. Lohner and address the question anew: 
Should a cause of action exist in this juris-
diction for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, and should the cause of 
action extend to bystanders whose emotion-
al injuries result from the infliction of inju-
ry to or death of third persons? We note 
that all parties have framed the issue in 
this fashion. It is unclear from the record 
whether Rogers' conduct is claimed to be 
sufficiently "wanton" to qualify under the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
standard. 
Virtually all jurisdictions in the United 
States now recognize a broad protected in-
terest in mental tranquility, first acknowl-
edged in Utah in Jeppsen. The negligent 
infliction of emotional distress as a sepa-
rate tort (distinct from the "willful and 
wanton" infliction of emotional distress or 
the negligent infliction of physical injuries 
with concomitant emotional injuries) has 
evolved rapidly only since the 1960s. See 
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs & D. Owen, Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54 (5th 
ed. 1984); Note, The Negligent Infliction 
of Emotional Distress: A Critical Analy-
sis of Various Approaches to the Tort in 
Light of Ochoa v. Superior Court, 19 Ind. 
L.Rev. 809 (1986). A common fact pattern 
for the cause of action is that existing in 
this case: a bystander observes negligent 
injury to a victim, which causes the by-
stander to suffer emotional distress. The 
courts have developed several rules affect-
ing recovery for the emotional distress. 
Currently, no jurisdiction precludes recov-
ery under any circumstances. Recovery is 
based upon satisfaction of one of three 
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standards: the impact rule, the zone-of-
danger rule, or a foreseeability standard. 
The impact rule requires that a plaintiff 
sustain some physical impact or injury 
which itself causes emotional distress. It 
was the original and most limited approach 
to emotional distress claims and was re-
sponsive to courts' early concerns about 
speculative damages and floods of litiga-
tion over trivial claims. Although this rule 
was at one time a majority position, it has 
fallen into disfavor in recent years for a 
number of reasons. Suspicion regarding 
the authenticity of claims of mental dis-
tress has decreased with medical advances 
in the field of psychiatry and psychology. 
The concern over case load impact has 
come to be seen as inadequate reason to 
deny legitimate claims, and those courts 
that have abandoned the impact rule have 
not in fact seen drastic increases in this 
type of litigation. Finally, the results of 
the impact rule were often arbitrary, capri-
cious, and unfair: the existence of a physi-
cal impact or injury frequently bore no 
rational relationship to the existence and 
severity of emotional injuries. Sometimes 
even the slightest of physical impacts (e.g., 
from smoke, dust, small jolts) was a suffi-
cient predicate for recovery for emotional 
injuries, whereas the absence of such triv-
ial impact could preclude recovery for the 
same injuries. See Note, The Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Crit-
ical Analysis of Various Approaches to 
the Tort in Light of Ochoa v. Superior 
Court, 19 Ind.L.Rev. 809 (1986). Because 
of its irrationality, the majority of courts 
abandoned the impact rule. 
The zone-of-danger rule, relied on by the 
trial judge in this case, was adopted by 
many courts as a less restrictive substitute 
for the impact rule. It is set forth in 
section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts: 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes 
emotional distress to another, he is sub-
ject to liability to the other for resulting 
illness or bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his con-
duct involved an unreasonable risk of 
causing the distress, otherwise than by 
knowledge of the harm or penl of a third 
person, and (b) from facts known to him, 
should have realized that the distress, if 
it were caused, might result in illness or 
bodily harm. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has 
no application to illness or bodily harm of 
another which is caused by emotional 
distress arising solely from harm or penl 
to a third person, unless the negligence 
of the actor has otherwise created an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the 
other. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The zone-of-danger rule offers many of 
the same benefits, although more expan-
sive in its application, as did the impact 
rule. It is an objective standard and serves 
to identify in consistent fashion those who 
are eligible to recover. Unfortunately, it 
also suffers from many of the disadvan-
tages of the impact rule: it is a rigid and 
inequitable limitation on recovery for inju-
ries which are otherwise indistinguishable 
from each other. The parent standing next 
to the child hit by a car has a cause of 
action; the parent standing twenty feet 
away does not. 
California was the first jurisdiction in the 
United States to extend liability beyond the 
zone of danger. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 
728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 (1968). 
In Dillon, Justice Tobriner of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court wrote: 
[T]he complaint here presents the claim 
of the emotionally traumatized mother, 
who admittedly was not within the zone 
of danger, as contrasted with that of the 
sister, who may have been within it. 
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of 
the rule that would deny recovery in the 
one situation and grant it in the other. 
In the first place, we can hardly justify 
relief to the sister for trauma which she 
suffered upon apprehension of the child's 
death and yet deny it to the mother 
merely because of a happenstance that 
the sister was some few yards closer to 
the accident. The instant case exposes 
the hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-
danger rule. In the second place, to rest 
upon the zone-of-danger rule when we 
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have rejected the impact rule becomes 
even less defensible. We have, indeed, 
held that impact is not necessary for 
recovery. The zone-of-danger concept 
must, then, inevitably collapse because 
the only reason for the requirement of 
presence in that zone lies in the fact that 
one within it will fear the danger of 
impact 
68 Cal.2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 75 (citation omitted). 
The court went on to observe that it had 
in the past "rejected the argument that we 
must deny recovery upon a legitimate claim 
because other fraudulent ones may be 
urged," 68 Cal.2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 917, 
69 CaLRptr. at 77, and that "the alleged 
inability to fix definitions on the different 
facts of future cases does not justify the 
denial of recovery on the specific facts of 
the instant case; . . . proper guidelines can 
indicate the extent of liability for such fu-
ture cases/' 68 Cal.2d at 735, 441 P.2d at 
919, 69 CaLRptr. at 79. Focusing on the 
foreseeability of risk, the court enunciated 
what has come to be known as the "Dillon 
rule," consisting of three factors which 
when evaluated determine the degree of 
foreseeability of the plaintiffs injury: (1) 
whether the plaintiff was located near the 
scene of the accident; (2) whether the emo-
tional trauma to the plaintiff was caused 
by actually witnessing the accident; and (3) 
whether the plaintiff and the victim were 
closely related. In light of these factors, 
the court can determine whether the injury 
was reasonably foreseeable. 68 Cal.2d at 
736, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 80. 
Hawaii has broadened the Dillon fore-
seeability standard, using a "pure" foresee-
ability analysis in bystander cases. Where 
serious emotional distress to a plaintiff-by-
stander is the reasonably foreseeable con-
sequence of the defendant's act, the de-
fendant's conduct is the proximate cause of 
the plaintiffs mental injury and general 
3. This distinction, while easy to make in many 
situations, is more difficult to make in cases 
involving medical treatment and mistreatment. 
Courts dealing with injury to or the death of a 
fetus during labor or birth have struggled over 
the classification of the pregnant woman as 
either direct victim or bystander. The mental 
injury is the result of a breach of the doctor's 
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tort principles are applied to impose liabili-
ty. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 
P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v. State, 52 
Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, reh'g denied, 52 
Haw. 283, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). In the 
absence of any limiting rules, however, the 
circumstances permitting liability extend 
far beyond ordinary expectations, creating 
grave theoretical and policy problems. 
The distinction between "direct victim" 
and "bystander" liability and its effect on 
the standard of recovery used by the 
courts must also be examined in order for 
the summary of currently accepted ap-
proaches to liability to be complete. 
Courts have characterized the direct or pri-
mary victim as the person to whom a duty 
was owed and who was directly injured by 
the breach of that duty. The bystander or 
secondary victim is anyone who was not 
directly injured by the defendant, but who 
suffered mental distress as a result of his 
or her association with the direct victim's 
injury. Thus, in fact situations involving 
car/pedestrian accidents, the person who is 
physically injured by the defendant may 
bring an action for emotional trauma as a. 
direct victim, while a bystander to the acci-
dent may recover based only on theories of 
secondary liability.3 
The direct victim/bystander distinction is-
important because in some jurisdictions it 
controls the standard which a plaintiff 
must meet in order to recover. In Califor-
nia, the Dillon standard no longer applies 
in direct victim cases. Instead, the court 
has adopted a broader foreseeability test 
and has abandoned the requirement that 
the emotional injury be physically manifest-
ed. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 
27 Cal.3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 CaLRptr. 
831 (1980). States that have adopted a 
zone-of-danger rule have, in effect, limited 
recovery to cases involving direct victims, 
disallowing recovery to bystanders. Plain-
duty to the pregnant woman directly and also of 
her witnessing the injuries to the fetus. The 
pregnant mother may therefore fall under ei-
ther the primary or the secondary victim classi-
fication. See, e.g., Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal-App. 
3d 108, 181 CaLRptr. 12 (1982) (parents classi-
fied as both direct victims and bystanders). 
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tiffs who are allowed to recover because 
they were present within the zone of dan-
ger are direct victims because the defend-
ant breached the duty of care owed them. 
Other witnesses falling outside of the zone 
are denied recovery due to the lack of 
direct injury and breach of a duty. The 
distinction between direct victims and by-
standers must be taken into account in 
fashioning and applying any standard of 
recovery for negligent infliction of emotion-
al distress. 
A final comment must be added to the 
discussion of direct victim and bystander 
liability. As a method by which a defend-
ant's liability can be limited in bystander 
cases, many jurisdictions require that any 
claimed emotional injury be manifested 
physically. This requirement persists in 
most jurisdictions as a sign of courts' con-
cern that emotional injury claims made by 
plaintiffs who have not been directly in-
jured are difficult to validate in the absence 
of physical symptoms and that deletion of 
this requirement would result in a flood of 
ill-founded bystander claims. However, 
some courts have recently dismissed these 
concerns as unwarranted and now allow 
recovery in the absence of any physical 
symptoms. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 
52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509, reh'g denied, 52 
Haw. 283, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Paugh v. 
Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 
(1983) (physical injury is evidence of the 
degree of mental injury). 
Our research has not disclosed, nor have 
the parties identified, any jurisdiction in the 
United States which bars all recovery for 
the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The policy considerations in favor of 
realistic limits on negligence liability have 
given rise in turn to the impact rule, the 
zone-of-danger rule, and the Dillon rule, 
but not to a refusal to recognize the cause 
of action under any circumstances. Al-
though the search for coherent, consistent 
application of liability principles in this area 
is difficult, that difficulty is an inappropri-
ate predicate for denial of redress to a 
whole class of legitimate and serious 
claims. 
It is further to be observed that the 
argument against allowing such an ac-
tion because groundless charges may be 
made is not a good reason for denying 
recovery. If the right to recover for 
injury resulting from wrongful conduct 
could be defeated whenever such dan-
gers exist, many of the grievances the 
law deals with would be eliminated. 
That some claims may be spurious 
should not compel justice to shut their 
[sic] eyes to serious wrongs and let them 
go without being brought to account. It 
is the function of courts and juries to 
determine whether claims are valid or 
false. This responsibility should not be 
shunned merely because the task may be 
difficult to perform. 
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 
P.2d at 347. 
We therefore sustain the trial judge in 
his determination that a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress 
may be maintained and undertake to estab-
lish general guidelines for the availability 
of recovery. A discussion of the rule of 
law to be applied must be general because 
the facts of this case would satisfy any of 
the three major tests applied in other juris-
dictions. The plaintiff here suffered an 
impact during the accident, receiving physi-
cal injuries to his foot. Furthermore, he 
was in the immediate zone of danger cre-
ated by Rogers' acts. Finally, all three of 
the Dillon criteria are present: he was 
located immediately at the scene of the 
accident, he saw and heard all of the events 
associated with the violence to the victim, 
and the victim was his child. 
I believe that the analytic approach of 
the Dillon rule is fundamentally sound in 
its focus on foreseeability as a necessary 
element of duty in negligence cases, and I 
would treat it as a legitimate starting point 
in the treatment of bystander causes of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.4 I am aware, however, that the 
4. My analysis in the remaining portion of this 
opinion has not been joined by a majority of the 
court. 
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rule as formulated in Dillon has not served 
as an adequate guarantee of certainty in 
application even by the California courts.5 
I therefore emphasize that it is impossi-
ble to articulate a mechanistic test, as op-
posed to identifying an analytic approach, 
in a case which challenges no traditional 
limitations. In effect, I would hold that 
one may recover for the negligent infliction 
of emotional distress when one was in the 
zone of danger created by the negligence 
and suffered a physical impact. I never-
theless express the view that the less arbi-
trary, more traditional tort analysis embod-
ied in the Dillon rule is appropriate. It is 
true that Dillon is more flexible than the 
impact and zone-of-danger rules, but it is 
not entirely free from the criticism that it 
too has 
become hardened and mechanical in prac-
tice because the courts attempting to ap-
ply [it] have no general policies to guide 
them in the difficult cases. 
If there is a rule which can determine 
liability in a more policy-oriented and less 
arbitrary manner while still drawing a 
line short of unlimited liability, such a 
rule should be adopted. A clear rule 
needs a clear rationale. 
Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress: The 
"Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S.Cal.L. 
Rev. 847, 867 (1981). 
The scholarly literature contains some 
interesting proposals for amelioration of 
the ambiguities unsolved by the Dillon 
rule. See, e.g., Note, The Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress: A Critical 
Analysis of Various Approaches to the 
Tort in Light of Ochoa v. Superior Court, 
19 Ind.L.Rev. 809 (1986) (suggesting a 
"flexible standard of liability" premised on 
5. In Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 159, 703 
P.2d 1, 216 Cal.Rptr. 661 (1985), the California 
Supreme Court attempted to resolve some of the 
uncertainty generated by California courts in 
applying the Dillon factors. A seemingly incon-
sistent pattern of decisions based on the factors 
stemmed from confusion surrounding the defi-
nitions of "contemporaneous" and "sensory ob-
servance of the accident." The court in Ochoa 
examined whether recovery under Dillon was 
limited to brief and sudden injury viewed con-
temporaneously by plaintiffs. The Ochoa court 
ultimately decided that the "sudden occurrence" 
v. ROGERS Utah 783 
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a general foreseeability analysis combined 
with a "clear and convincing'' standard of 
proof); Note, Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress: Developments in the 
Law, 14 BaltL.Rev. 135 (1984) ("The best 
approach may be to treat negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress as any other neg-
ligence action, employing the criteria of 
foreseeability and proximate cause, keep-
ing in of damages to be awarded."); Note, 
Limiting Liability for the Negligent In-
fliction of Emotional Distress: The "By-
stander Recoveryn Cases, 54 S.Cal.L.Rev. 
847 (1981) (proposing that bystander recov-
ery for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress be limited to "those types of emo-
tional distress for which a reasonable per-
son would be emotionally unprepared")-
The decisional law pertaining to negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, par-
ticularly bystander cases, illustrates 
what may happen when unnecessarily 
doctrinaire approaches, based on policy 
considerations, are substituted for tradi-
tional negligence criteria. The adoption 
of arbitrary standards such as the impact 
and zone of danger rules were well-inten-
tioned efforts at addressing fears of un-
limited liability, but many deserving 
plaintiffs were left without a remedy.... 
Courts that have recognized this proposi-
tion have relaxed rigid rules, but the 
foreseeability standard that has been 
substituted in their stead has not been 
completely free of arbitrary criteria. 
While certain factors, such as proximity 
to and observance of the accident, rela-
tionship to the victim, and physical symp-
toms, may be valuable indicia of the mer-
its of a complaint, courts should not ap-
requirement adopted by some courts was an 
unnecessary restriction of Dillon. 39 Cal.3d at 
168, 703 P.2d at 7, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 667. How-
ever, Ochoa has been criticized as further add-
ing to the confusion in the application of the 
Dillon factors by declining to clarify "contempo-
raneous" beyond the facts of the case and avoid-
ing a definition of "sensory observance of the 
accident." See Note, The Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: A Critical Analysis of Vari-
ous Approaches to the Tort in Light of Ochoa v. 
Superior Court, 19 Ind.L.Rev. 809, 822-24 
(1986). 
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ply them so inflexibly as to preclude an 
otherwise provable claim. 
Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: Developments in the Law, 14 
Balt.L.Rev. at 159. 
Although I believe that expanding Utah's 
tort principles to allow recovery for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress is pru-
dent, I also recognize that philosophical 
concerns about the proper limits of tort 
liability exist. While liability standards 
have been greatly expanded in the past few 
decades, the pendulum has recently begun 
to swing back, with courts and commenta-
tors now reexamining the effectiveness and 
cost of the current system. At least one 
scholar believes that the focus should be on 
standards that prevent accidents rather 
than on compensation, a goal that is better 
served by traditional insurance than by the 
courts.6 It is possible that a major rede-
sign of current tort law will become neces-
sary and desirable. In the meantime, I am 
satisfied that the limits on recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress 
contained in the Dillon rule strike an ap-
propriate balance between the need for 
flexibility and the need for predictability. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Remanded for trial. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in 
part): 
My view of this case differs somewhat 
from that of Justice Durham. Since this is 
a case of first impression in this Court on 
an issue that is almost certain to come 
before trial courts frequently, I write sepa-
rately to express my distinct views and to 
provide the trial courts, as well as the bar, 
with additional guidance.1 
[2,3] My first point of concern pertains 
to the claim for punitive damages against 
the driver of the van, defendant Rogers, 
which is addressed in Part II of Justice 
6. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and 
Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale LJ. 1521 (1987) 
(wherein the author concludes: "[T]he diffuse 
and indiscriminate expansion of substantive tort 
liability has led to the unraveling of insurance 
markets in an increasing number of contexts. 
This unraveling can be arrested only if substan-
Durham's opinion. I agree that punitive 
damages may be recovered from drunk 
drivers so long as the appropriate standard 
of fault is met. I further agree with Jus-
tice Durham that the appropriate standard 
of fault for the imposition of punitive dam-
ages against a drunk driver is knowing and 
reckless disregard for the rights of others. 
I think it important to emphasize that not 
every case involving intoxicated driving 
presents a jury question on punitive dam-
ages. See Miskin v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378, 
(Utah 1988). However, I agree that on 
balance, there is sufficient evidence to go 
to the jury on the question of whether 
Rogers7 conduct satisfied the "knowing and 
reckless" standard. The way he operated 
the NAC truck, combined with his high 
level of intoxication at the time of the 
accident, the excessive drinking that oc-
curred immediately before the accident, 
and his history of drinking and operating a 
motor vehicle, all provide sufficient evi-
dence from which a jury could find that 
punitive damages are warranted. See Mis-
kin. Therefore, I join Justice Durham in 
reversing the trial court's grant of partial 
summary judgment on the question of Rog-
ers' liability for punitive damages. 
[4,5] My second area of concern relates 
to the claim for punitive damages against 
Rogers' employer, defendant NAC, which 
is addressed in Part III of Justice Dur-
ham's opinion. I agree that an employer 
may be liable for punitive damages as a 
result of a tortious act of an employee, but 
only so long as that liability is premised on 
the conduct of the employer, and I join 
Justice Durham in concluding that the ap-
propriate standard for determining that lia-
bility is set forth in section 909 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). Ap-
plying that standard to this case, Justice 
Durham would hold that the question of 
NAC's liability should go to the jury. I do 
not agree that we can determine from the 
record before us whether there is sufficient 
tive standards of liability are redefined to focus 
exclusively on the accident reduction goal." Id. 
at 1589.). 
1. Because three other Justices have joined in 
this opinion, it represents the views of a majori-
ty of this Court on the issues it addresses. 
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evidence to go to the jury on this question. 
In arguing for the imposition of punitive 
damages against NAC, the Johnsons seri-
ously rely only on the test set forth in 
section 909(b) of the Restatement, which 
requires proof that "the agent was unfit 
and the principal or a managerial agent 
was reckless in employing or retaining him 
[or her]." A careful examination of Justice 
Durham's opinion reveals that while the 
evidence there summarized is certainly suf-
ficient to raise the question of whether 
NAC was generally careless in how it su-
pervised its employees, none of the evi-
dence regarding the facts known to NAC is 
directed to the question of whether NAC 
was "reckless in employing or retaining" 
Rogers. For that reason, I am not con-
vinced that the evidence is sufficient to go 
to the jury on the question of punitive 
damages as to NAC. 
In granting a summary judgment for 
NAC, the trial court operated on the as-
sumption that NAC could not, under any 
circumstances, be held liable for punitive 
damages. Therefore, it did not have occa-
sion to closely scrutinize the facts to see 
whether, viewed in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, they could satisfy section 
909(b)'s requirements. Now that we have 
corrected the trial court's misimpression as 
to the law and have set out the appropriate 
standard for determining NAC's possible 
liability, the matter should be remanded to 
the trial court to permit the parties to 
properly present the issue and the trial 
court to determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to go to the jury. 
[6] My final concern is with the issue 
addressed in Part IV of Justice Durham's 
opinion, the existence of and rules for im-
plementing a cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. I agree 
that this cause of action does exist in Utah, 
as the trial court held. However, I depart 
from Justice Durham with regard to the 
legal standard by which such a cause of 
action is to be defined in Utah. Her opin-
ion surveys the law of other states—a help-
ful exercise—but it declines to choose from 
among the various possible rules because 
all seem satisfied in this case. If we were 
to do no more, courts and counsel would be 
left entirely without satisfactory guidance 
v. ROGERS Utah 785 
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in dealing with all cases but the present 
one. We cannot permit every claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress to 
go to a jury under such varying standards 
as each trial judge may choose. We have a 
practical obligation to articulate under-
standable standards and to impose worka-
ble limits for use in the Utah courts. In 
the exercise of that function, I think it best 
to adopt as the test for determining liabili-
ty for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress the standards set forth in section 
313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1965), as explained in the comments ac-
companying that section. 
I recognize that some of the limitations 
inherent in the "zone of danger'' rule of 
section 313 are hard to justify on a purely 
theoretical basis. Indeed, I have serious 
concerns about the theoretical rationality 
of any limits that can be imposed on liabili-
ty for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Cf. Hackford v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah 1987) 
(declining to recognize a loss-of-consortium 
cause of action, in part because of the 
difficulty of defining rational limiting prin-
ciples). However, section 313's limitations 
seem to strike a fair balance between the 
interests those injured have in recovering 
damages and the interests of the courts 
and the public in predictable rules. At 
some future date, we may determine that 
there is merit in some of the other ap-
proaches surveyed in Justice Durham's 
opinion. However, until we have had expe-
rience with the cause of action, I conclude 
that it is best to take the more conservative 
approach and adopt the Restatement rule 
as written. 
For the foregoing reasons, I join in re-
manding to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with the opinion of Jus-
tice Durham and with this opinion, where it 
varies from Justice Durham's. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART, J., concur in the 
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
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$ 3 1 3 . Emotional Distress Unintended 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional dis-
tress to another, he is subject to liability to the other 
for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved 
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise 
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third per-
son, and 
(b) from facts known to him should have realized 
that the distress, if it were caused, might result in ill-
ness or bodily harm. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no appli-
cation to illness or bodily harm of another which is 
caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or 
peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the 
actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodi-
ly harm to the other. 
See Reporter's Notes* 
Comment on Subsection (1): 
a. The rule stated in this Section does not give protec-
tion to mental and emotional tranquillity in itself. In general, 
as stated in § 436 A, there is no liability where the actor's negli-
gent conduct inflicts only emotional distress, without resulting 
bodily harm or any other invasion of the other's interests* Such 
emotional distress is important only in so far as its existence 
involves a risk of bodily harm, and as affecting the damages 
recoverable if bodily harm is sustained. See § 903. 
b. The rule stated in this Section is unnecessary to make 
the actor's conduct negligent and, therefore, to subject him to 
liability if the actor should realize that it involves an unreason-
able risk of causing bodily harm in some other manner, such 
as by immediate impact. As to the effect which is to be given 
to the fact that the act negligent because otherwise threatemHST 
bodily harm results in the harm solely through the effect of the 
actor's conduct upon the mind or emotions of the other, see 
§436. 
c. The rule stated in this Section which determines the 
liability of a person who negligently subjects another to emo-
tional distress likely to cause physical consequences differs from 
the rule stated in § 312, which determines the liability of one 
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who intentionally subjects another thereto in one particular. 
As is stated in Comment d under § 312, the actor who inten-
tionally subjects another to emotional distress may under some 
circumstances take the risk that the other may, unknown to him, 
have a resistance to emotional strain which is less than that of the 
ordinary man although characteristic of a recognized minority 
of human beings. On the other hand, one who unintentionally 
but negligently subjects another to such an emotional distress 
does not take the risk of any exceptional physical sensitive-
ness to emotion which the other may have unless the circum-
stances known to the actor should apprise him of it. Thus, 
_one who negligently drives an automobile through a city street 
in a manner likely merely to "startle a pedestrian on a side-
walk, is not required to take into account the possibility that 
the latter may be so constituted that the slight mental disurbance 
will bring about an illness. 
Illustrations: 
1. A is employed to drive B to a hospital. He is 
informed that B is desperately ill. Nonetheless, he drives 
at a rapid rate of speed and cuts in and out of traffic. He 
thereby puts B in such fear of a collision that B suffers a 
serious increase in her illness. A is subject to liability 
toB. 
2. Under the facts assumed in Illustration 1, A would 
not be liable to B if he had no reason to know of B's ill-
ness. 
Comment on Subsection (2): 
d. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies only where 
the negligent conduct of the actor threatens the other with emo-
tional distress likely to result in bodily harm because of the 
other's fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance, arising out 
of fear for his own safety, or the invasion of his own inter-
ests. It has no application where the emotional distress arises 
solelv because of harm or peril to a third person, and the negli-
gence of the actor has not threatened the plaintiff with bodily 
harm in any other way. 
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a 
child in the street, and its mother, in the immediate vicinity, 
witnesses the event and suffers severe emotional distress re* 
suiting in a heart attack or other bodily harm to her, she cannot 
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recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself in the path 
of the vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with 
bodily harm to herself otherwise than through the emotional 
distress at the peril to her child. 
As to the rule to be applied where the other is so threatened 
with bodily harm in another manner, and instead suffers emo-
tional distress at the peril or harm of a third person, which re-
sults in bodily harm to the other, see § 436, 
TOPIC 7. DUTIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Scope Note: The duties to take positive action imposed by 
common law are generally duties to act with reasonable care in 
order to give to others the aid or protection which the perform-
ance of the duty would afford them. The words "reasonable 
care'* are here used to denote that the actor is required to do that 
which a reasonable man would believe to be necessary to afford 
the aid or protection to which the other is entitled, but no more. 
There are many cases, however, in which the actor deliber-
ately fails to perform a duty which he knows is vital to the secu-
rity of another. In such case, his misconduct is often either 
intentional, that is, done for the very purpose of harming the 
other or with knowledge that harm will certainly result from it 
(see § 8 A), or is in reckless disregard of the other's interests 
(see §500). 
This Topic deals with only a part of the situations in which 
there is a duty of protective action. The duty of maintaining 
land and structures thereon in safe condition which is imposed 
upon the possessor and lessor by virtue of their possession or 
of a covenant to repair is stated in §§328E-379, which deal 
with the liability of possessors and lessors of land. The duty 
of careful custody which is imposed upon possessors and cus-
todians of animate and other chattels likely to escape from the 
place where they are put untesa^sarefully guarded is-stated in: 
Volume 3. The duties of inspection and disclosure of the defec-
tive condition of chattels which are imposed upon those who 
use, dispose, or otherwise deal with chattels are stated in §§ 388-
408. As to the duties which are imposed by legislative enact-
ment, see §§ 286-288 C. The duty to continue services gratui-
tously rendered or to perform a gratuitous undertaking and the 
duty so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them 
from causing bodily harm to others are stated in this Topic. 
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